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A
mAbstract
We provide updated evidence on the effects of living wage laws in U.S. cities,
relative to the earlier research covering only the first six or seven years of existence
of these laws. There are some challenges to updating the evidence, as the CPS data
on which it relies changed geographic coding systems in the mid-2000s. The
updated evidence is broadly consistent with the conclusions reached by prior
research, including a recent review of that earlier evidence. Living wage laws reduce
employment among the least-skilled workers they are intended to help. But they
also increase wages for many of them. This implies that living wage laws generate
both winners and losers among those affected by them. For broader living wage
laws that cover recipients of business or financial assistance from cities, the net
effects point to modest reductions in urban poverty.
JEL codes: J23, J38
Keywords: Living wages, Wages, Employment, PovertyI. Introduction
The first living wage law was passed in Baltimore in 1994, and living wage laws quickly
spread – in less than two decades – to more than 140 jurisdictions in the United States, in-
cluding many of the nation’s largest cities that together comprise a significant share of the
nation’s urban population. The early wave of research on living wages used data covering
only the initial years of the diffusion of the policy through U.S. cities, typically ending in
2002 or even earlier (see, e.g., Adams and Neumark (2004a, 2005a)). Given the paucity of
observations used in the original research, and given that we now have many more years of
observation on the effects of living wages in the cities that passed them earlier, and new liv-
ing wage laws in numerous cities, it is an opportune time to update the evidence on the
effects of living wage laws, and that is the goal of this paper.
Living wage laws have two central features. First, they typically impose a wage floor that is
higher – and often much higher – than traditional federal and state minimum wages. For ex-
ample, as of the end of 2009 (the end of the sample period in this paper) the minimum wage
in California, Illinois, and Massachusetts was $8, whereas the living wage was $12.79 in Bos-
ton, $11.03 in Chicago, and $10.30 in Los Angeles.1 Second, coverage by living wage laws is
generally quite narrow, but also varies across cities. Most commonly, cities impose wage2012 Neumark et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Early estimates of the share of workers covered by “contractor-only” living wage laws in cit-
ies with living wage laws hovered around 1%.2 Other cities also impose the wage floor on
companies receiving business assistance from the city, almost always in addition to coverage
of city contractors. These “business assistance laws” cover firms receiving financial assist-
ance, tax abatements, grants, low interest loans, and many other forms of government as-
sistance from cities. Finally, a handful of cities require that city employees or employees of
municipal leaseholders be paid the mandated living wage.3
The prior research on living wages focused on their effects on workers and their families.
The focus on workers and families stems from what is nearly always stated as the central
goal of living wages – to raise incomes of low-wage workers in order to reduce urban pov-
erty. If living wages help reduce poverty, they do this via two mechanisms. First, they raise
wages of the low-wage employees of covered businesses – and perhaps also of other work-
ers who might be affected by the presence of a living wage law in a city. And second, the
gains from these higher wages for low-wage workers accrue to low-income families.
While raising wages of low-wage workers via living wages may seem a natural way to fight
poverty, there are two reasons why such mandates may not help to achieve this goal, aside
from the fact that they do not cover many workers. First, economic theory predicts that be-
cause a mandated wage increase operates essentially as a tax on the use of lower-skilled labor,
living wages may discourage the use of such labor. Thus, whatever wage gains accrue to
workers who retain their jobs must be offset against potential employment (or hours)
declines for other workers. The question of whether living wage laws reduce employment of
covered workers is probably the central question that has been contested in the research
literature.4
Second, living wages may not effectively target low-income families. Broadly speaking, low-
wage workers in the United States have large shares from two groups. The first is very young
workers who have not yet acquired many labor market skills but who are likely to escape
low-wage work as they acquire skills. The second is low-skilled adults who remain mired in
low-wage jobs and who – as adults – are much more likely to be in poor families.5 Thus,
whether living wages help reduce poverty depends on wage gains and employment losses,
and the extent to which the gains from living wages (the wage increases) as opposed to the
costs (job loss) fall on individuals in poor families. There is also an issue of the interaction be-
tween changes in labor market earnings and changes in government benefits, which we take
up in this paper.
There is a critical point in the discussion of whether living wages help poor and low-
income families that bears emphasizing. Standard economic theory predicts that a man-
dated wage floor like a living wage will reduce employment. However, how a mandated
wage floor affects the distribution of income, and poor families in particular, is purely an
empirical question. One can be absolutely convinced, from the theory or, preferably, the
evidence, that living wages reduce employment. But this provides no reason to believe
on a priori grounds that a living wage would fail to help poor families. The existence of
job losses is perfectly compatible with living wages doing more for poor families via the
wage increases that some workers get than the job losses that others experience. There
is, in other words, no logical deduction from standard economic theory to the conclu-
sion that living wages (or minimum wages) could not help the poor. The latter question
is a purely empirical one.
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the past research literature, are best suited for estimating effects of living wage laws, largely
following Adams and Neumark (2005a). However, these methods and the data on which
they rely have been contested, so to explain why we continue to use these data and meth-
ods, we provide a summary of the criticisms they have encountered and an explanation of
why we view these methods and data as the best way to study the effects of living wages, in
light of the available data. As in the existing literature, our focus is on the effects of living
wage laws on low-wage workers and low-income families.
II. Past research on living wages
This study uses “before-and-after” comparisons of labor market outcomes in U.S. cities
that implemented living wage laws and cities that did not. Such studies became possible
once a sufficient number of U.S. cities implemented living wage laws.
Simulation studies
There was an earlier wave of “impact” or “simulation” studies that tried to assess the conse-
quences of living wage laws before they were implemented in cities.6 These simulation stud-
ies used data describing the labor market in a particular city, and assumptions about the
behavioral responses of firms and workers to the proposed living wage. Naturally, the
answers depend strongly on the assumptions–most importantly, but not exclusively, on
the assumed employment response to the higher wage mandated by the living wage law. As
a consequence, these simulation studies are less compelling than research using standard
methods of policy evaluation based on treatment and comparison groups. However, the
simulation studies do have a role to play, in that they can capture unique aspects of the city’s
labor market or its proposed living wage law. Nonetheless, they should be informed by evi-
dence from the experience of other cities that have implemented living wage laws, rather
than relying on assumed behavioral responses that could be chosen in a way that dictates
the findings.
Longitudinal evidence
After the passage of some time following enactment of the first living wage laws, and some
of the earliest simulation studies of living wages, Neumark and Adams (2003a, 2003b)
provided the first estimates of the effects of living wages on workers and families, based
on longitudinal comparisons between cities where the mandates were and were not intro-
duced. These studies are explained in some detail, to set the stage for the discussion of
criticism of the data and methods they used, and for the updated analysis that follows.
The Neumark and Adams studies covered the inception of living wage laws in the
mid-1990s through 2002, using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from the
monthly Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) files, which capture individual wages and
employment, and the March Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) files,
which capture family income. The analysis was done at the level of Metropolitan Statis-
tical Areas (MSAs) or Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs), based on where
CPS respondents reside. (The CPS does not tell us where people work.) MSAs/PMSAs
include areas surrounding the major cities whose living wage laws are studied; but
MSA residents who live in suburbs tend to work in the central city, where jobs are con-
centrated (Cervero, 2002).
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low end of the wage or skill distribution (the bottom decile in each city-month cell),
and on family income relative to needs. The effects of living wages are identified from
differential changes in outcomes in cities that implemented or raised a living wage rela-
tive to cities that did not – a difference - in - differences (DD) research design. Neumark
and Adams also distinguished between contractor-only and broader business assistance
living wage laws, and it was only the latter that turned out to matter.7
Overall, the evidence indicated that living wages raise wages at the bottom of the wage
distribution. For those in the bottom decile in each city, when all living wage laws are trea-
ted uniformly, the evidence on wages points to an elasticity with respect to the living wage
of 0.04 at a lag of 12 months, which is not statistically significant at the 10% level. How-
ever, when living wages are classified as contractor-only or business assistance living wage
laws, the effects (on all outcomes) are considerably sharper for the living wage laws with
business assistance provisions.8 The evidence pointed to a statistically significant impact
(at the 10% level) on wages only of business assistance laws, with an estimated elasticity of
0.07.9 In contrast, the estimated impact of contractor-only laws is small and statistically
insignificant.
The employment effects are estimated using the same basic empirical framework. Be-
cause employment is a discrete outcome, the models estimated are linear probability
models. Also, given that wages are not observed for the non-employed, wages are
imputed for everyone, and the parallel to focusing on low-wage workers in the wage
analysis is to focus on low-skill (i.e., low predicted wage) workers in the employment
analysis. For living wages generally, the estimated employment effect on those in the
bottom decile of the predicted wage distribution is negative and significant at the 5%
level at a lag of 12 months, paralleling where the wage results were detected. The esti-
mated coefficient of −0.053 implies that a 100% (or one log unit) increase in the living
wage reduces employment by 5.3 percentage points. Given an employment rate of
43.4% in the lowest decile of the imputed wage distribution in the data used in this re-
gression, this represents a 12% employment reduction, or an elasticity of −0.12.10 When
separate effects are estimated for business assistance and contractor-only living wage
laws, both estimates are negative, but there is a significant employment effect only for
business assistance living wage laws, with an elasticity of −0.17, and a much smaller
(and insignificant) estimate for contractor-only laws.11,12
In this analysis it is assumed that changes in living wages are exogenous – that is, the
policy changes are not themselves responses to changes in labor market outcomes. Ruling
out reverse causality is difficult, because there is unlikely to be an instrumental variable
that predicts the adoption (or level) of living wages and that also varies over time; given
that the model includes city dummy variables, the variation over time is required. There
are, though, some approaches to this problem in the existing research. For example, in
Adams and Neumark (2005b), the experiences of cities enacting living wages laws were
compared only with cities in which living wage laws were approved but then overturned
or annulled by judicial rulings, legislative decisions, etc. The virtue of this approach is that
in both types of cities living wages were “almost adopted,” so that the factors that might
have influenced policy can more effectively be held constant. The estimated effects of liv-
ing wages are little changed relative to the estimates using all control cities. In addition,
the models control for prior trends that could reflect differences in changes in labor
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correlated with living wage variation, or help explain it.
The evidence on wage and employment effects sets the stage for weighing these com-
peting effects in how living wage laws affect poverty. To examine the impact of living
wages on poverty, linear probability models are estimated for the full sample of families
from the CPS ASEC files covering 1995 through 2001. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable equal to one if a family’s income falls below the federal government’s
threshold for poverty, and zero otherwise. The evidence yields negative point estimates
(implying poverty reductions) for both types of living wage laws, but only the estimated ef-
fect of business assistance living wage laws is statistically significant (at the 10% level). For
business assistance living wage laws, the estimated coefficient is −0.024, which implies that
a one log unit increase in the living wage reduces the poverty rate by 2.4%. Relative to an
18.6% poverty rate, this represents a 12% reduction, or an elasticity of −0.12. This seems
like a large effect, given the wage elasticity for low-wage workers below 0.1. Living wages
cannot lift families from well below the poverty line to well above it. But living wages may
help nudge families over the poverty line, and the estimated average wage effects are likely
manifested as much larger gains concentrated on a possibly quite small number of work-
ers and families. Thus, even coupled with some employment reductions, living wages can
lift a detectable number of families above the poverty line.
Assessment of the earlier literature
Comprehensive reviews of the research literature through the initial phase of the passage
of living wage laws were provided in Adams and Neumark (2004a and 2004b). These
reviews summarize previous evidence, but also provide a review and critique of other re-
search on the impact of living wages. Holzer (2008) reviewed the living wage literature
more recently, although this review focuses almost entirely on the same research (extend-
ing through 2005), as there was little additional research done since. A comprehensive and
more up-to-date review of the living wage literature that covers a few recent studies is pro-
vided in Charles River Associates (2011), from which the research in this paper was drawn.
Holzer’s (2008) review of the Neumark and Adams studies, as well as other studies
that tried to estimate the observed impact of living wages based on longitudinal vari-
ation, reached conclusions very much parallel those of Neumark and Adams:13
“Living wage laws have both modest benefits and modest costs for low-wage
workers. Living wage laws raise the wages of the lowest-wage workers. They may
also result in . . . modest reductions in poverty. However, they lead to modest
reductions in employment for the lowest-wage workers . . . Living wage laws can be
useful but meaningful increases in the earnings of low-wage workers and reductions
in poverty require more powerful public policies” (pp. 2–3).
Criticisms of methods and data
Because the goal of this paper is to update these estimates, it is useful to consider the key
issues that have been raised regarding the methods and the data on which they rely. There
are four key criticisms. The first criticism is that the estimates of disemployment effects
obtained in the longitudinal studies are simply too large to be plausible. The second criticism
is that the evidence of stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws cannot be
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no workers. The third criticism is that the CPS data used in the longitudinal analyses do not
provide large enough samples to detect effects of living wage laws. And the fourth criticism
is that the econometric methods used are incorrect. We address each of these in turn.14
Implausible estimates
Fairris and Reich (2005, p. 10) claim that estimates in Adams and Neumark (2005a) indicate
that 91% of affected workers would lose their jobs, implying employment elasticities that are
huge and simply implausible, thus dismissing the evidence out of hand. This claim, however,
is simply incorrect. Adams and Neumark consider a 35% business assistance living wage in-
crease. Given their estimated employment elasticity for those in the bottom decile of the
skill distribution (the affected workers) of −0.076, and an employment rate in this group of
44%, the employment effect implied by the increase they consider is −6%, an estimate that
cannot be used to dismiss the methods out of hand as providing implausible estimates.15
Business assistance living wage laws cannot matter much
Some criticisms claim that hardly any workers were actually affected by the business assist-
ance provisions of living wage laws, which would be difficult to reconcile with the findings
that business assistance living wage laws matter more than contractor-only laws (Pollin
et al., (2008, pp. 242–6)). There was and remains uncertainty over how many workers are
covered by business assistance living wage laws, but the evidence does not support the
claim that hardly any workers were affected.
Fairris et al. (2005) suggest that the number of workers employed by business assistance
recipients whose wages were affected by the Los Angeles living wage law as of their
2001–2003 survey was only around 1,100 (their Tables 2.1 and 2.5). However, because the
survey covers contractors only, it is not representative of assistance recipients, and presum-
ably misses most of them.16 Moreover, in 2003, Los Angeles expanded its living wage policy
to apply to employees of real estate developers that receive public subsidies (and their sub-
contractors), although not their tenants. Finally, Luce’s (2004) book on the implementation
of living wage laws concludes that business assistance coverage was extensive and was ef-
fectively extended beyond those workers explicitly covered by the living wage law:
“In early 1998, coalition members got word of city negotiations over a large
redevelopment project in Hollywood . . . with major developer TrizecHahn . . . In the
end, TrizecHahn agreed not only to pay living wages and benefits to its workers but also
agreed to require retailers leasing space in the development to pay living wages and give
first priority in hiring to Hollywood residents. In addition, the living wage coalition won
an agreement that required seven hundred to eight hundred of the staff positions at the
new development to be unionized. The coalition went on to win similar agreements for
other major developments in the city” (Luce, 2004, p. 122, italics added).17
Moreover, in a recent living wage study Lester and Jacobs (2010) explicitly try to identify a
subset of cities that were “effectively implementing business assistance living wage laws”
(p. 1), and specifically include three cities – Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Oakland (their
Table C) – for which Pollin et al. (2008) claimed hardly any workers were affected. Lester
and Jacobs concur that we should expect larger effects from business assistance provisions
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opment wage standard likely to have the most widespread effect on employment” (p. 3).
In addition to the issue of coverage, there are other reasons that business assistance living
wage laws could have larger effects. The kinds of mechanisms described above by Luce
(2004) – operating outside the specific channels established by the living wage law, perhaps
through changing community norms – could generate additional impacts of business assist-
ance living wage laws. In addition, the two types of laws may have qualitatively different
effects, and the characteristics of contractor-only laws may make it more likely that their
effects can be mitigated or avoided. First, contractor-only laws typically require that employ-
ers pay the mandated wage for work done as part of the contract. Assuming that contractors’
employees do some other work in addition to city contracts, employers can mitigate the costs
of complying with living wage laws by reallocating their higher-skilled or higher-seniority
(and therefore higher-wage) labor to the contract work and their lower-wage labor to the
non-contract work, or even by reducing wages on non-contract work. In contrast, an estab-
lishment created with the help of business assistance from a city would appear to have no
choice but to pay all employees no less than the mandated living wage for all of their work.18
Second, contractors may be able to pass through a large share, if not all, of their increased
costs to cities, given that they are selling their services to the city and contractors compete
on equal footing. In contrast, business assistance recipients compete in private markets; con-
sider, for example, a mall developed with such assistance, in which the stores have to com-
pete with similar stores elsewhere that are not bound by living wage requirements.19
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that it is difficult to gauge how many workers are covered
by business assistance laws, as there is typically little hard data on this. We point readers
to a recent study of the proposed implementation of a new business-assistance living wage
law in New York City (Neumark et al., forthcoming). This study did extensive data work
to combine city administrative data and confidential establishment-level data from the
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages to get much better measurement of workers
who would have been affected by this specific law. This analysis resulted in an estimate
that 12.9% of workers earning less than $10 per hour (and living in the city) would have
been affected by the proposed law, or about 1.2% of the entire workforce of city residents.
Interpreted in light of the longitudinal estimates focusing on the bottom decile of the
wage or skill distribution, this estimate suggests that about 12% of workers in that bottom
decile would have been affected. Given this estimate, a wage elasticity of 0.07 with respect
to business assistance living wages (as reported above) may be in the right ballpark, if we
think about a living wage law raising the effective wage floor by about 50%. The employ-
ment elasticity of −0.17 noted above is probably a little more outside the likely range we
might expect, if we consider that this estimate is in the typical range of estimated mini-
mum wage-employment elasticities, and minimum wages usually affect a larger share of
workers studied (e.g., teenagers). In addition, the proposed New York law was extensive,
so reconciling the existing estimates of the effects of business assistance living wage laws
with coverage probably does require assuming that business assistance living wage laws
have broader effects than on those workers directly affected.
The CPS data do not provide large enough samples
A third criticism is that the CPS data – which we also use in this study – do not deliver
sample sizes sufficiently large to detect effects of living wage laws (Brenner et al., 2002;
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the bottom line is that a standard research design for estimating policy effects produces
estimates of non-negligible effects that, insofar as theory makes predictions, are consistent
with expectations. It is hard to reconcile this evidence with claims that the CPS data could
not possibly detect effects of living wages; indeed such arguments are usually made to
counter failure to find a significant effect.21
The econometric methods are flawed
A final criticism is that the econometric methods are incorrect. Neumark and Adams focus
attention on models estimated for the workers in the bottom decile of the wage distribution.
Brenner et al. (2002) argued that this approach leads to spurious evidence of living wage
effects, and that a quantile regression approach should be used to avoid this bias. They then
estimated a quantile regression for the 10th percentile, with a striking difference in results.
Whereas the initial Neumark and Adams estimate of the wage effect below the 10th percent-
ile (which they replicate) was 6.95 (and significant) – implying an elasticity of wages in this
range with respect to living wages of 0.7 – the quantile regression estimate was only one-
tenth as large, at 0.74 (and insignificant).
This is a misuse of quantile regression, however – one which should not replicate the posi-
tive wage effects, and would not detect a true positive wage effect. Neumark and Adams’ re-
gression looks at the wage distribution without conditioning on skill, picks out those below
the 10th percentile in each city-month cell, and then estimates the effects of living wages on
wages for them – asking whether living wage laws increase the wages of the lowest wage
workers (those below the 10th percentile). In contrast, a quantile regression conditional on
skill asks whether living wages increase the wages of those at the 10th percentile relative to
wages of workers with similar characteristics, whether these workers earn high or low wages.
But because living wage laws are simply floors on absolute wages, there is no reason to ex-
pect a general shift in relative wages within skill groups. Indeed, when Adams and Neumark
(2005a) estimate a quantile regression for the 10th percentile without conditioning on skill,
the estimated wage effect is similar to their original estimate.
This discussion indicates that the data and methods used in the earlier longitudinal
studies of the effects of living wages are not flawed. They are therefore used in our
research updating evidence on the effects of living wages, as described in the following
section.III. The effects of living wage laws: updating the evidence
CPS data
We update the earlier longitudinal analyses using CPS data through 2009, which was the
latest year available at the time this research was done (the period covered by the ASEC files
extended through 2008, versus 2009 for the MORG files). A substantial complication is
introduced by changes in the geographic classification of areas in the CPS. Geographic in-
formation in the CPS is reported by place of residence according to a classification system
of “statistical areas” based on population density and commuting patterns. Before 2005, the
system was based on four-digit Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) codes for
the MSA, PMSA, or Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA). In 2005, it chan-
ged to one based on Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSA), which have five-digit FIPS codes.
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New England) based around one or more “central cities” that can cross state lines.
Geographically-interconnected PMSAs are combined to form CMSAs, of which there are
18 in the United States. The post-2005 CBSA system is based on core urban areas instead
of central cities. CBSAs are classified as either Metropolitan Areas or Micropolitan Areas,
based on size requirements. Larger Metropolitan Areas are subdivided into Metropolitan
Divisions, which are comparable to the subdivision of CMSAs into PMSAs in the
pre-2005 definitions. One or more CBSAs may be grouped together to form a Consoli-
dated Statistical Area (CSA). The definitions of these areas pre- and post-2005 are spelled
out in Table 1.
The Census Bureau provides a crosswalk mapping post-2005 CBSAs to their pre-2005
MSA/PMSA counterparts.22 The crosswalk contains 935 unique CBSAs (both Micropoli-
tan Areas and Metropolitan Areas), but the 2005–2009 CPS data report only 275 unique
CBSAs, in large part because the CPS does not report Micropolitan Area CBSAs. Of the
275 unique CBSA FIPS codes, 245 CBSAs could be mapped directly to an MSA or CMSA
using the crosswalk provided. Another 16 CBSAs were manually mapped using the New
England Cities and Towns Area (NECTA) definitions based on names.23 The last step in
applying the crosswalk consists of consolidating PMSAs in the pre-2005 period into
CMSAs, because the post-2005 CBSAs in the CPS data do not include Metropolitan
Division distinctions. All PMSAs belonging to the 18 CMSAs in the United States were
therefore rolled up into their appropriate CMSAs pre- and post-2005 in order to have
consistent geographic areas across time.
These steps resulted in 215 unique MSA/CMSA areas. Geographic identifiers are sup-
pressed (for confidentiality reasons) for 35 of these – some before and some after the
change in geographic classification. Again, though, this is not pertinent to our analysis, be-
cause this suppression occurs only for smaller cities that get dropped because of too few
observations. Thus, we have 180 MSAs or CMSAs defined on a consistent basis over the
years we study.
To assess the accuracy of geographical linkages over time, we chose five MSAs/CMSAs
for which the conversion was complicated and five that were simple, and computed the
shares black, Hispanic, and with low educational attainment (high school degree or
equivalent), as well as weighted population estimates, over time in both the ASEC and
MORG data. We wanted to check for breaks at the time of the switch in geographic classi-
fication, which could point to inconsistent geographic definitions over time. There was no
indication of unusual changes surrounding the switch in geographic definitions in 2005,
for either the simple or the complicated CMSA aggregations. Figure 1 provides an ex-
ample of one of these analyses, focusing on the share black in the ASEC data. This share
is a useful metric, because residential segregation by race implies that incorrect changes in
the geographic areas would likely deliver noticeable changes in the share of the population
that is black. A more problematic issue, discussed below, is the accurate measurement of
the living wage in these MSAs/CMSAs, in cases where living wages are in place in only
some cities in the MSA/CMSA, or differ across them.
The empirical analysis is done with individual-level data. However, the analysis requires
the estimation of percentiles of the wage or predicted wage distribution for MSAs/CMSAs,
by month or year. To ensure a reasonable level of accuracy in doing this, we required that
an MSA/CMSA had at least 50 observations on individuals age 16–70 in all months of the
Table 1 Pre- and post-2005 geographic classification systems
1996-2005 2005-2009
Classification: MSA, PMSA, CMSA CBSA – Metropolitan Area, Micropolitan Area
Units: Counties (except in New England, which uses cities and towns)
Based around one or more central cities
Counties (except in New England, which uses cities and towns)
Population
requirements:
MSAs must have 50,000 or more in the central city, or a defined urbanized area of at least 50,000,
provided that the component county/counties of the MSA have a total population of at least
100,000
Metropolitan areas must have 50,000 or more in the core urban area
Micropolitan areas must have 10,000-50,000 in the core urban area
PMSAs must have at least one county with 100,000 population, 60% urban, 35% residents of county
work outside the county, less than 2,500 population of the largest central city of the level A MSA
Under certain conditions, one or more CBSAs may be grouped together to form
a larger statistical entity known as a combined statistical area (CSA)
Two or more PMSAs combine to form a CMSA
Inclusion
rule:
Counties that include a central city of the MSA, or at least 50 percent of the population of such a
city, provided the city is located in a qualified urbanized area; counties in which at least 50 percent
of the population lives in the qualified urbanized area(s); outlying counties are also included if
certain conditions are met (population density, 40-50% of workers commute to the central city, etc.)
Core urban county, and adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and
economic integration (as measured by commuting to work) with the urban core
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Figure 1 Assessment of Matching of Geographic Classifications, ASEC Data, Share Black.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/11sample period 1996–2009. To have comparable analysis samples for the MORG and the
ASEC data files, we required that this be met for both data files. This requirement was met
by 39 of the unique MSAs/CMSAs after the geographic matching and roll-ups.Data on living wages
Cities, rather than metropolitan areas, are the political units that adopt most living wage
laws.We characterize the living wage laws prevailing in a metropolitan area based on the liv-
ing wages passed by the major cities in the metropolitan area. Given the change in geo-
graphic coding, it is not entirely straightforward to define a list of cities on which to focus
for the entire analysis period. Prior to the change, the classification of larger cities was based
on the definition of “central cities” (Frey et al., 2004), but with the switch to CBSAs larger
cities were classified as “principal cities.” We needed to choose a set of cities within the 39
MSAs/CMSAs for which to code living wage laws in detail. We chose all central or princi-
pal cities subject to two criteria: a population of at least 250,000 residents according to 2000
Decennial Census data;24 and if no city in the metropolitan area had at least 250,000 resi-
dents, the largest city in the metropolitan area. These criteria led to 52 cities within the 39
MSAs/CMSAs; both the cities and the MSAs/CMSAs are reported in Table 2.
For these cities,we needed historical information on living wage laws and other charac-
teristics of the laws, such as whether they apply to recipients of financial assistance.25 We
first reviewed city websites for evidence of a living wage law and to identify a contact for
follow-up. For cities where we initially found no evidence of a living wage law, we
attempted to contact the City Clerk, City Manager, City Attorney, or Procurement/Public
Works/Economic Development Officer by telephone to confirm whether the city had a
living wage law at any time since 1995. If we were unable to reach the city representative
by telephone, we followed up with email correspondence. At times, the first point of con-
tact within a city directed us to another contact, at which point we would repeat the
process (call, followed by email). If the representative confirmed that the city never had a
Table 2 The 52 cities in the analysis sample, and their 39 MSAs/CMSAs
MSA/CMSA City MSA/CMSA City
Albuquerque, NM MSA Albuquerque Milwaukee-Racine, WI CMSA Milwaukee (1995)
Atlanta, GA MSA Atlanta Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA Minneapolis (1997)
Boise City, ID MSA Boise Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA St. Paul (2007)
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT CMSA Boston (1998) New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA CMSA Newark (2003)
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA Charlotte New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA CMSA New York (2002)
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI CMSA Chicago (1998) Oklahoma City, OK MSA Oklahoma City
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN CMSA Cincinnati (2002) Omaha, NE-IA MSA Omaha
Cleveland-Akron, OH CMSA Cleveland (2000) Orlando, FL MSA Orlando (2003)
Columbus, OH MSA Columbus (2004) Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD CMSA Philadelphia (2005)
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CMSA Dallas Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA Phoenix
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CMSA Fort Worth Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA Mesa
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CMSA Arlington Pittsburgh, PA MSA Pittsburgh
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO CMSA Denver (2000) Portland-Salem, OR-WA CMSA Portland (1996)
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO CMSA Aurora Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA MSA Providence
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI CMSA Detroit (1998) Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA Raleigh
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI MSA Grand Rapids Sacramento-Yolo, CA CMSA Sacramento (2004)
Honolulu, HI MSA Honolulu Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA Salt Lake City
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX CMSA Houston San Diego, CA MSA San Diego (2005)
Kansas City, MO-KS MSA Kansas City (2005) San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA CMSA Oakland (1998)
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA Las Vegas San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA CMSA San Francisco (2000)
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA CMSA Los Angeles (1997) San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA CMSA San Jose (1998)



















Table 2 The 52 cities in the analysis sample, and their 39 MSAs/CMSAs (Continued)
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA CMSA Anaheim St. Louis, MO-IL MSA St. Louis (2000)
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA CMSA Long Beach Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA Tampa
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA CMSA Riverside Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV CMSA Baltimore (1995)
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA Miami (2006) Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV CMSA Washington (2006)
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/11living wage law, we “closed” the research on the city. If the representative indicated that
there was, or had been, a living wage law, we added the city to the list for further research.
For the cities with evidence of a living wage law, we obtained as much possible informa-
tion from 1995 through 2010 from the city website or directly through a city representative.
Using the city website, we reviewed the current living wage law found in the city’s municipal
code or code of ordinances which, at times, contained a reference to the ordinance creating
the code.26 The documents reviewed in the search typically generated information on the
living wage history (e.g., council agendas/minutes, budget presentations, or living wage or-
dinance summaries), or reference forms containing the living wage rates (e.g., posters,
memoranda, or living wage rate change bulletins), from which we gained additional detail.
Once we established the broad picture, we used specific dates to track down the actual ordi-
nances adopted and the living wage rates established during a given year. If necessary, we
contacted city representatives by telephone or email to confirm findings or provide informa-
tion that was not attainable from the city web pages.
Using this information, we coded the wage levels for the 26 cities that meet our criteria
with living wages among the MSAs/PMSAs that we study, for each year and month from
January 1995 through December 2009.27 We also coded whether or not the living wage law
applies to business assistance recipients.28 The new information on living wage laws empha-
sizes the potential value of updating the research on living wages. Of these 26 cities, 14 had
enacted living wages prior to 2002, and 12 did so afterwards. Table 2 shows the year of en-
actment of living wages for the cities in our analysis that enacted them. Thus, between the
cities with new living wage laws, plus the additional observations on cities that passed them
earlier and increased the level of the living wage subsequently, there is a good deal more in-
formation on the effects of living wages – and of course information that is more
contemporary.
Results: wage and employment effects
The first two columns of Table 3 repeat the basic estimates, from Adams and Neumark
(2005a), of the effects of living wages on wages of workers in the bottom decile of the
wage distribution, and the bottom decile of the skill (predicted wage) distribution; these
estimates were discussed in Section II. The data cover all residents of MSAs and
PMSAs identified in the CPS ORG data in the 1996–2002 period, in city-month cells
with 25 or more observations. The key living wage variable in the model, for which
estimates are reported in the table, is the log of the maximum of the living wage or the
minimum wage prevailing in the city, lagged 12 months.29 The maximum of the two is
used to capture the effective wage floor, and the 12-month lag is used based on evi-
dence that the effects of living wages do not occur instantly but emerge over about one
year.30 The regressions include controls for city, year, month, minimum wages, and
other individual-level controls. The specification also includes differential linear time
trends for cities passing or not passing living wage laws, or passing different types of
living wage laws. The first row reports the estimates from a single regression on the liv-
ing wage variable, without distinguishing the types of living wage laws. In the second
and third rows, instead, each column reports results from a specification that distin-
guishes between contractor-only and business assistance living wage laws (by interact-
ing the living wage variable with dummy variables for these types of laws, constructed
to be mutually exclusive).
Table 3 Estimated effects of living wages on log wages and employment, lowest decile of wage distribution or predicted wage distribution (for employment),
living wages defined at MSA/PMSA level, prior estimates and re-estimations for 1996-2002
Previous Estimates Restricted to 79 MSAs/
PMSAs in CMSAs
Restricted to 79 MSAs/PMSAs,
corrected living wage laws
Same as columns (5) and (6),
with city-specific trends
Larger sample of MSAs/PMSAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable: Log wages Employment Log wages Employment Log wages Employment Log wages Employment Employment
Specification 1
Log living wage, lagged 12 months 0.040 −0.053** 0.046* −0.047** 0.043* −0.066** 0.034 −0.061** −0.061**
(0.030) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.026) (0.020) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019)
Specification 2
Business assistance living wage laws:
Log living wage, lagged 12 months 0.067* −0.076** 0.071** −0.067** 0.080** −0.069** 0.070* −0.073** −0.074**
(0.039) (0.018) (0.028) (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) (0.037) (0.021) (0.021)
Contractor-only living wage laws:
Log living wage, lagged 12 months −0.006 −0.027 0.005 −0.017 −0.007 −0.070** −0.016 −0.043 −0.043
(0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) (0.028) (0.035) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032)
N 46,374 116,466 44,588 90,695 44,588 90,695 44,588 90,695 92,091
The estimates in columns (1) and (2) are from Adams and Neumark (2005a, Tables 2 and 4). The data on labor market outcomes and other worker-related characteristics come from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
monthly Outgoing Rotation Group files (ORGs/MORGs), from January 1996 through December 2002. Only observations on city-month or city-year cells with 25 or more observations are retained. The living wage
variable is the maximum of the log of the living or minimum wage, and so equals the minimum wage when there is no living wage. The regressions include controls for city, year, month, log minimum wages, and
other individual-level controls. All specifications also allow differential linear time trends for cities passing or not passing living wage laws, or passing different types of laws, except columns (7) and (8). The entries in
the first row are from a specification with a single living wage variable, and the entries in the second and third rows are from a specification that interacts the living wage variable with dummy variables for the type of
living wage. The MSAs/PMSAs beginning in columns (3)-(4) are the MSAs and PMSAs that constitute the 39 CMSAs that we can track for the entire sample period and that meet the data sufficiency requirement (50
valid wage observations per MSA/PMSA and month). The list of these 79 MSAs/PMSAs used in columns (3)-(6) is available from the authors upon request. There are 86 MSAs/PMSAs in column (9), where we do not
impose the same data sufficiency requirement on the employment and wage samples. Estimates are weighted by individual sample weights. ‘**’ (‘*’) superscript indicates estimate is statistically significant at five-
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/11The wage equation is a log-log specification, so the coefficients are elasticities. For
example, the upper-left estimate means that a 100% increase in the living wage (e.g.,
from a $5 minimum wage to a $10 living wage) would increase wages in the bottom de-
cile of the wage distribution by 0.04 log points, or approximately 4%. The coefficients
from the employment regressions measure the change in the probability of employment
in response to a one-unit increase in the log living wage (or a 100% increase).
For the first specification, the estimates in columns (1) and (2) indicate that living
wages lead to higher wages and lower employment; only the estimated employment ef-
fect is statistically significant. In the second specification, business assistance living
wage laws have significant positive effects on wages, and significant negative effects on
employment, whereas the effects of the narrower contractor-only laws are smaller and
insignificant (and the wage effect is very close to zero). The magnitudes imply that a
100% business assistance living wage increase boosts wages in the bottom decile of the
distribution by 6.7%, and reduces employment in the bottom decile by 7.6 percentage
points.
The remainder of Table 3 shows the consequences of some changes to the sample
necessitated by the aggregation of MSAs/PMSAs to MSAs/CMSAs, and of other changes
to the data or specification. First, columns (3) and (4) report estimates using the exact
same data and specifications, but restricting attention to the MSAs/PMSAs that are aggre-
gated to MSAs/CMSAs in what follows. This entails very small reductions in the sample
size, as only 12 very small MSAs/PMSAs that were included in the original analysis are
dropped. For the wage analysis, 79 MSAs/PMSAs meet this criterion and other sample
size restrictions. More MSAs/PMSAs meet the sample size restrictions for the analysis of
employment, because the samples for these outcomes are larger. However, we report most
results for the consistent set of MSAs/PMSAs. We also report key results for the largest
possible samples of MSAs/PMSAs within these MSAs/CMSAs, on the argument that
these give us the most reliable estimates for each outcome. The changes in the estimates
shown in columns (3) and (4) are inconsequential.
Columns (5) and (6) incorporate some slight changes in the living wage data based on
the new research on the history of living wage laws. Most of the estimates are essentially
unchanged, with the exception of the employment effect for contractor-only living wage
laws, which is now the same magnitude as for business assistance laws and statistically sig-
nificant. Columns (7) and (8) report specifications in which less-restrictive linear trends –
now, simply city-specific linear trends – are substituted for the differential linear time
trends for cities passing or not passing living wage laws, or passing different types of laws.
For business assistance living wage laws, which are our main focus, this change has little
bearing on the estimates. Again, though, the results for contractor-only laws are more sen-
sitive (and, consequently, so are the results for living wages overall). In particular, there is
now no evidence of a statistically significant positive wage effect for living wages overall,
or of significant (positive) wage effects or (negative) employment effects for contractor-
only laws. As reported in column (9), the employment effects are robust to including an
additional seven MSAs/PMSAs that meet the data sufficiency criterion for employment
but not wages. The conclusion from these estimates is still that business assistance living
wage laws lead to positive wage effects and negative employment effects, both of which
are statistically significant. The estimates with city-specific trends become our “baseline”
estimates for purposes of comparison going forward.31
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/11Table 4 explores the consequences of extending the data through 2009, which requires
the aggregation to MSAs/CMSAs. Now the key variable in the model, for which estimates
are reported in the table, is the log of the maximum of the minimum wage or the weighted
living wage (weighted by population share of the MSAs or PMSAs in the MSA/CMSA),
lagged 12 months as before. This weighted living wage variable is calculated by multiplying
the living wage in an MSA/PMSA by the population share of that MSA/PMSA in the total
MSA/CMSA population living in MSAs or PMSAs (based on 2000 Census data), and sum-
ming the weighted living wages across all MSA/PMSAs in the MSA/CMSA.
As columns (3) and (4) show, once we aggregate and extend the data, the evidence
changes relative to the baseline estimates (columns (1) and (2)). For wages, the estimated
effects of the overall living wage and the two separate living wage variables are all positive
but statistically insignificant, and the estimate for business assistance living wage laws –
which was larger and statistically significant in the previous analyses – declines. For the em-
ployment effects, although all of the estimates are negative, none is large compared to the
overall and business assistance living wage effects estimated earlier, and the estimate for
business assistance living wages, which should have the highest coverage, is not significant.
To explore the consequences of the aggregation of MSAs and PMSAs to MSAs/CMSAs
necessitated by the changes in the CPS data, in columns (5) and (6) we keep everything the
same as in columns (1) and (2) – in particular, using the data only through 2002 – and the
only change we make is to do this aggregation. The estimates also change substantially rela-
tive to columns (1) and (2) and are not very different from those when we extend the data
through 2009. This illustrates that it is the aggregation that changes the estimates, rather
than extension of the sample period.
The aggregation to MSAs/CMSAs turns out to pose a severe empirical problem for a
very simple reason: it is difficult to measure living wages at the MSA/CMSA level be-
cause of many instances in which MSAs or PMSAs within an MSA/CMSA adopt living
wages at different times (and also at different levels, although the differences in timing
are the more serious issue). Table 5 illustrates the problem, for the case of Boston.32
Boston passed a living wage in 1998, while the other MSAs and PMSAs in the CMSA
did not. For the years in the sample period through 2002 (when the original analysis
ended), somewhat under half the observations in the CMSA are outside of the Boston
PMSA. In the original analysis through 2002, the Boston living wage was assigned only
to the Boston PMSA. However, with the change in geographic classification, the other
five MSAs/PMSAs were aggregated with the Boston PMSA, resulting in the living wage
being assigned to all six of them beginning in July 1998, when the Boston living wage
was implemented. Table 5 shows that in 1997 (and the same is true earlier) when there
was no living wage in Boston, there is no measurement problem. The living wage takes
effect midway through 1998, so the percentage of observations with the wrong living
wage (and the average magnitude of the error) is fairly small in that year. In 1999 (and
subsequently), the error rate and magnitude of the error becomes considerably larger.
Table 6 shows a similar problem for the aggregated San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose
CMSA. In this case, the adoption of living wages differs, with each of the three major
constituent MSAs/PMSAs adopting living wage laws at different times. Nonetheless,
the same severe measurement problem emerges. One difference in this case, though, is
that the error decreases over time, as the major MSAs/PMSAs each adopt a living
wage.
Table 4 Updated estimates of effects of living wages on log wages and employment, lowest decile of wage distribution or predicted wage distribution (for
employment)
“Baseline” estimates, Table 3,
columns (7) and (8), 1996-2002
Living wage variables aggregated to
CMSA level, 1996-2009
Living wage variables aggregated to
CMSA level, 1996-2002
Living wages defined at MSA/
PMSA level, 1996-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Log wages Employment Log wages Employment Log wages Employment Log wages Employment
Specification 1
Log living wage, lagged 12 months 0.034 −0.061** 0.026 −0.019** 0.009 −0.039* 0.037 −0.052**
(0.031) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.036) (0.021) (0.034) (0.017)
Specification 2
Business assistance living wage laws:
Log living wage, lagged 12 months 0.070* −0.073** 0.021 −0.005 0.025 −0.026 0.051 −0.055**
(0.037) (0.021) (0.023) (0.012) (0.042) (0.026) (0.041) (0.023)
Contractor-only living wage laws:
Log living wage, lagged 12 months −0.016 −0.043 0.022 −0.029** −0.052 −0.053 0.020 −0.048**
(0.040) (0.032) (0.027) (0.014) (0.057) (0.035) (0.056) (0.023)
N 44,588 90,695 86,614 188,769 44,588 90,695 53,038 109,725
Note: See notes to Table 3. ‘*’ (‘**’) superscript indicates estimate is statistically significant at five-percent (ten-percent) level. All specifications have city-specific trends. Reported standard errors are robust to



















Table 5 Living wages and aggregation errors, boston CMSA and MSAs/PMSAs, years surrounding enactment of Boston living wage
Year MSA name CMSA living wage MSA/PMSA living wage % obs. incorrect Avg. magnitude of difference
1997 Boston, MA-NH PMSA (New Hampshire portion not identified) 5.25 5.25 0% 0%
1997 Lowell, MA-NH PMSA (New Hampshire portion not identified) 5.25 5.25 0% 0%
1997 Manchester, NH PMSA 4.89 4.89 0% 0%
1997 Nashua, NH PMSA 4.88 4.88 0% 0%
1997 Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME PMSA (Maine portion not identified) 4.89 4.89 0% 0%
1997 Worcester, MA-CT PMSA (Connecticut portion suppressed) 5.25 5.25 0% 0%
1998 Boston, MA-NH PMSA (New Hampshire portion not identified) 6.74 6.74 0% 0%
1998 Lowell, MA-NH PMSA (New Hampshire portion not identified) 6.62 5.25 46% 26%
1998 Manchester, NH PMSA 6.63 5.15 48% 29%
1998 Nashua, NH PMSA 6.69 5.15 50% 30%
1998 Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME PMSA (Maine portion not identified) 6.84 5.15 55% 33%
1998 Worcester, MA-CT PMSA (Connecticut portion suppressed) 6.68 5.25 48% 27%
1999 Boston, MA-NH PMSA (New Hampshire portion not identified) 8.32 8.32 0% 0%
1999 Lowell, MA-NH PMSA (New Hampshire portion not identified) 8.32 5.25 100% 58%
1999 Manchester, NH PMSA 8.32 5.15 100% 61%
1999 Nashua, NH PMSA 8.32 5.15 100% 62%
1999 Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME PMSA (Maine portion not identified) 8.32 5.15 100% 62%
1999 Worcester, MA-CT PMSA (Connecticut portion suppressed) 8.31 5.25 100% 58%
Boston’s living wage was adopted in 1998. The living wage variables are averaged over months in a year. The MSA/PMSA living wage sometimes shows small deviations before there is a living wage because the table



















Table 6 Living wages and aggregation errors, San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose CMSA and PMSAs, years surrounding enactment of living wages in PMSAs
Year MSA name CMSA living wage MSA/PMSA living wage % obs. incorrect Avg. magnitude of difference
1997 Oakland, CA PMSA 5.01 5.01 0% 0%
1997 San Francisco, CA PMSA 5.01 5.01 0% 0%
1997 San Jose, CA PMSA 5.01 5.01 0% 0%
1997 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 4.98 4.98 0% 0%
1997 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 5.00 5.00 0% 0%
1998 Oakland, CA PMSA 6.25 7.34 75% −14%
1998 San Francisco, CA PMSA 6.21 5.64 15% 10%
1998 San Jose, CA PMSA 6.13 6.13 0% 0%
1998 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 5.93 5.61 8% 6%
1998 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 6.40 5.67 20% 13%
1999 Oakland, CA PMSA 9.50 8.11 100% 17%
1999 San Francisco, CA PMSA 9.50 5.75 100% 65%
1999 San Jose, CA PMSA 9.50 9.50 0% 0%
1999 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 9.50 5.75 100% 65%
1999 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 9.50 5.75 100% 65%
2000 Oakland, CA PMSA 9.80 8.30 100% 18%
2000 San Francisco, CA PMSA 9.79 6.77 100% 50%
2000 San Jose, CA PMSA 9.81 9.81 0% 0%
2000 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 9.81 5.75 100% 71%
2000 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 9.85 5.75 100% 71%
2001 Oakland, CA PMSA 10.10 8.53 100% 18%
2001 San Francisco, CA PMSA 10.10 9.00 100% 12%
2001 San Jose, CA PMSA 10.10 10.10 0% 0%



















Table 6 Living wages and aggregation errors, San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose CMSA and PMSAs, years surrounding enactment of living wages in PMSAs
(Continued)
2001 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 10.10 6.25 100% 62%
2002 Oakland, CA PMSA 10.10 8.69 100% 16%
2002 San Francisco, CA PMSA 10.10 10.00 100% 1%
2002 San Jose, CA PMSA 10.10 10.10 0% 0%
2002 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 10.10 6.75 100% 50%
2002 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 10.10 6.75 100% 50%
The Oakland and San Jose living wages were adopted in 1998, and San Francisco’s in 2000. The living wage variables are averaged over months in a year. The MSA/PMSA living wage sometimes shows small deviations
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/11There is a similar aggregation problem for other cities for which MSAs/CMSAs in-
clude MSAs/PMSAs with different living wages. There are only 20 MSAs/CMSAs that
do not suffer from either problem, and only five of these have living wage laws; hence
we could not reliably estimate living wage effects using this subset of observations.
As a consequence of this aggregation problem, the best alternative is likely to revert
to the specification at the MSA/PMSA level, and to use as long a sample period as pos-
sible prior to the change in geographic coding. For the analysis of wages and employ-
ment, this implies extending the sample period through 2004, which unfortunately
does not provide as much “updating” as we would like. Nonetheless, this does give us
information on an additional four cities that passed living wage laws in 2003 or 2004
(Columbus, OH, Newark, NJ, Orlando, FL, and Sacramento, CA). Results are reported
in the final two columns of Table 4. There are some changes relative to the baseline
estimates in columns (1)-(2). For the living wage variable overall, and the business as-
sistance living wage variable, the estimated wage effects are smaller, and the wage effect
for business assistance living wage laws is no longer statistically significant, although
the estimated coefficient still implies a sizable effect: a 100% living wage increase boosts
wages in the bottom decile of the wage distribution by 5.1%. For employment effects,
in contrast, the evidence is somewhat stronger. There is still evidence of a statistically
significant negative effect of business assistance living wage laws on employment of
less-skilled individuals and of living wage laws overall. But now the estimate is similar (al-
beit a bit smaller), and statistically significant, for contractor-only living wages as well.33
We also estimated these specifications for different ranges of the wage and skill distribu-
tion. This is of interest for two reasons. First, as confirmation that we are truly detecting
effects of living wages on low-wage, low-skilled workers in the results reported above, we
should clearly not find evidence of positive wage and negative employment effects higher up
in the wage or skill distribution. Second, a living wage can generate demand shifts toward
higher-skilled workers, increasing their wages and employment (e.g., Fairris and Bujanda,
2008). And as Adams and Neumark (2005a) showed, many poor families have workers who
earn relatively low wages or have relatively low skills but are not necessarily in the bottom
10th of the distribution.34 Thus, policies that end up helping workers who are in a higher part
of the wage distribution can reduce poverty.35
As reported in Table 7, we found little evidence of effects higher up in the wage or skill dis-
tribution. The wage effects were small and centered on zero, and not statistically significant.
The estimated employment effects were also small and statistically insignificant, although
more uniformly negative. These results suggest that effects of living wages on the distribution
of family incomes stem mainly from the effects of living wages on the lowest-wage and
lowest-skilled workers. Moreover, the absence of any evidence higher up in the wage or skill
distribution paralleling that for the lowest-wage, lowest-skill workers makes it less likely that
our results for the latter groups reflect spurious effects of changes in economic conditions
correlated with living wages. That is, these results serve as a placebo test.
Based on our updated evidence, there is now stronger evidence of disemployment
effects, and it is not only limited to business assistance living wage laws. And there is
weaker evidence of wage effects. Two points related to these findings merit discussion.
First, in the earlier work, the stronger evidence of effects of business assistance living
wage laws was attributed to the likely higher coverage of these laws as well as other fea-
tures of those laws, although the evidence was not decisive (see Adams and Neumark,
Table 7 Estimated effects of living wages on log wages and employment in other ranges of the wage or predicted wage distribution (for employment) living
wages defined at MSA/PMSA level, updated, 1996-2004
0th-10th percentile 10th-25th percentile 25th-50th percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Wages Employment Wages Employment Wages Employment
Specification 1
Log living wage, lagged 12 months 0.037 −0.052** −0.013 0.000 −0.013 −0.003
(0.034) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.017)
Specification 2
Business assistance living wage laws:
Log living wage, lagged 12 months 0.051 −0.055** −0.018 0.017 −0.029 0.013
(0.041) (0.023) (0.028) (0.022) (0.030) (0.011)
Contractor-only living wage laws:
Log living wage, lagged 12 months 0.020 −0.048** −0.006 −0.019 0.006 −0.022
(0.056) (0.023) (0.025) (0.045) (0.025) (0.033)
N 53,038 109,725 65,812 158,308 109,064 263,897
See notes to Table 3. ‘**’ (‘*’) superscript indicates estimate is statistically significant at five-percent (ten-percent) level. All specifications have city-specific trends. Columns (1)-(2) include observations less than or equal
to the 10th percentile; columns (3)-(4) from greater than the 10th to less than or equal to the 25th; and columns (5)-(6) from greater than the 25th to less than or equal to the 50th. Note that the sample sizes do not
change in close proportions to the percentage of observations in each range based solely on the percentiles. This occurs because the percentiles are calculated for fairly small samples in many instances (since they are
computed for city-month cells), so there are often large numbers of ties in the rankings of observations. We define the samples in the different columns as explained earlier in the note, so in some cases the share of
observations in a range can substantially exceed or fall short of the strict definition. (For example, if there are many observations on either side of the 10th percentile, but the 25th percentile is higher, then more than
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/112005a). There is no indication one way or another that coverage of contractor-only laws
has increased because of some inherent broadening of the laws. However, the laws may
now have stronger effects, because in the earlier years of living wage laws, there may
have been a greater preponderance of non-renewed contracts that were not covered. It
is true that the business assistance provisions also often applied only to new assistance.
But as discussed earlier, these business assistance provisions may have broader effects.
Second, the early wave of research on living wages was based on relatively few periods cov-
ering a fairly small number of cities. As a result, the results were described as somewhat
provisional, requiring more data and more analysis for confirmation.36 Consequently, it is
not surprising that there are some changes in the answers relative to the earlier research, al-
though in general most of the qualitative results persist, including the results for poverty dis-
cussed below. At the same time, the above discussion regarding the problems of aggregating
geographic data on U.S. cities, using CPS data, indicates that we have been unable to add a
large number of years of data with reliable measurement of living wages.Results: Effects on low-income families
We next report estimates of the effects of living wages on family income (poverty) and on
government benefits to families. These estimates tell us how the various and possibly com-
plicated wage and employment (and hours) effects on individuals ultimately affect families.
Table 8 focuses on whether living wages reduce the probability that families are poor.
These models are estimated for the full sample, not the lower decile of the wage or skill
distribution (or other ranges). Column (1) repeats the estimates from Adams and Neumark
(2005a). The estimates are negative for living wages generally and for business assistance
living wages (although the point estimate is larger for contractor-only living wages). To in-
terpret the estimates, the −0.024 estimate for business assistance living wage laws, for ex-
ample, implies that a 100% increase in this type of living wage reduces the poverty rate by
2.4 percentage points. Columns (2) and (3) report the results for the restricted sample (79
cities), and then with city-specific trends. These results are consistent with business assist-
ance living wage laws being the only types of living wage laws that reduce poverty.
We next return to the issue of aggregation of urban areas into MSAs/CMSAs, which is
necessary to update the results fully. Doing the aggregation without changing the sample
period (column (4)) leads to estimated effects – in the direction of reducing poverty – that
are a bit larger. In columns (5)-(6), we show the aggregated estimates through 2009, and
then the disaggregated estimates (which we think are most reliable) through 2003,37 the
last year for which the disaggregated data are available. The basic qualitative conclusion –
that business assistance living wage laws reduce urban poverty – is robust across all of
these estimates. However, the estimates through 2003, without aggregating, no longer
show a statistically significant effect of business assistance living wage laws in reducing
poverty. Nonetheless, we do not want to dismiss the aggregated results, which show a sta-
tistically significant effect of business assistance living wages in reducing poverty.38 More-
over, in both columns (5) and (6) we no longer – relative to the earlier estimates reported
in column (1) – find any effect of contractor-only living wage laws on poverty.
Finally, we examined information on income-support and other assistance programs.
Given that many income-support programs require low family income to qualify, or tie
benefits to income, we might expect the beneficial effects of living wages to be more
Table 8 Estimated effects of living wages on probability that family is poor, prior estimates, re-estimations, and updated estimates
1995-2001 Restricted to 79 MSAs/
PMSAs, corrected living
wage laws, 1995-2001
Living wage variables aggregated to
CMSA level, 1995-2001










City-specific trends City-specific trends City-specific trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample mean 0.179 0.179 0.178 0.182 0.181
Specification 1
Log living wage, lagged
12 months
−0.035** −0.024 −0.019 −0.045** −0.001 −0.008
(0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.016)
Speciification 2
Business assistance living wage laws:
Log living wage, lagged
12 months
−0.024* −0.027 −0.041* −0.069** −0.024** −0.035
(0.013) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.012) (0.022)
Contractor-only living wage laws:
Log living wage, lagged
12 months
−0.038 −0.012 0.012 −0.003 0.017 0.021
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.011) (0.020)
N 142,421 115,818 115,818 117,658 308,008 157,048
See notes to Table 3. The March ASEC files are used for these estimates. Poverty is defined in terms of total income. The estimates in column (1) are from Adams and Neumark (2005a, Table 5). The regressions include
controls for city, year, and minimum wages. Estimates are weighted by family sample weights. ‘**’ (‘*’) superscript indicates estimate is statistically significant at five-percent (ten-percent) level. Reported standard errors
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fits or affect the amounts for which families are eligible from social programs such as
Medicaid, S-CHIP, Food Stamps, housing assistance, and the Earned Income Tax
Credit.39 The implication is that families that see earnings rise because of a living wage
law would also receive fewer government benefits. Of course, the effects of job loss go
in the opposite direction.40
These changes might be of interest to local policymakers. If benefits decline, then to
the extent that these benefits come from the federal (or state) government, there would
be less money coming into a city. As a prime example, the federal Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) has grown into the largest program for providing income support to
lower-income families (Blank, 2002). As a consequence, when a worker’s earnings rise,
the inflow of federal dollars via the EITC can decline. On the other hand, the expenses
for some benefits paid by the local government would fall.
The CPS data give us information on public assistance/welfare, food stamps (SNAP), free
or reduced-price hot lunches at school, public housing, and energy assistance.41 The evi-
dence in Table 9 generally indicates that higher living wages reduce support from or partici-
pation in these programs. Higher business assistance living wages are associated with
significantly lower probabilities that families receive welfare, live in public housing, or re-
ceive energy assistance. Although there are both winners and losers from a higher living
wage, the winners far outnumber the losers,42 apparently on net reducing the number of
beneficiaries. The point estimates also suggest that living wages reduce payments from wel-
fare or food stamps, and reduce the likelihood of children getting free or reduced-price hot
lunches, but these estimates are generally not statistically significant.IV. Conclusions
The goal of this paper was to provide updated evidence on the effects of living wage laws
in U.S. cities, relative to the earlier research on the first six or seven years of existence of
these laws. The early round of research on living wages extended from 1995–2002, whereas
the data we use in this paper potentially double the length of the sample period, to 2009,
and nearly double the number of cities with living wages. As it turns out, however, there
are some challenges to updating this evidence, as the CPS data on which it relies changed
geographic coding systems in the mid-2000s, necessitating some “rolling up” of urban areas
into larger areas to maintain consistency across the sample period – aggregation that in
some cases appears to influence the estimates. The aggregation problems work against the
goal of updating the evidence, making it more difficult to draw inferences beyond 2004 for
the wage and employment analysis and 2003 for the family income analysis, although we
also report the estimates extending as far as we can.
The focus is on the effects of living wages on low-wage or low-skill workers, and on low-
income families. Turning first to wages, the updated evidence continues to point to living
wages increasing wages at the bottom of the wage distribution – for the purposes of this
paper, in the bottom decile of the wage distribution. The point estimates to some extent in-
dicate that the wage effects are stronger for business assistance than for contractor-only liv-
ing wage laws. However, in the updated evidence the estimated wage effects, while
uniformly positive, are not statistically significant. The preferred estimates taking account of
both the updating and aggregation problem are that the elasticity of wages in the bottom
Table 9 Estimated effects of living wages on income support and program participation, 1995-2003
Public assistance/welfare Food stamps Any benefits from:
Value of benefits Any benefits Value of food stamps Any benefits Free or reduced-price hot lunch Public housing Energy assistance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample mean 145.53 0.037 154.93 0.079 0.103 0.030 0.021
Specification 1
Log living wage, lagged 12 months −14.857 0.001 −12.479 0.007 −0.019* −0.017** −0.009
(56.722) (0.011) (40.266) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
Specification 2
Business assistance living wage laws:
Log living wage, lagged 12 months −96.483 −0.025** −23.055 −0.004 −0.024 −0.032** −0.020**
(67.362) (0.011) (48.909) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008)
Contractor-only living wage laws :
Log living wage, lagged 12 months 70.999 0.028** −1.355 0.018 −0.014 −0.002 0.003
(71.827) (0.014) (59.606) (0.021) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
N 157,048 157,048 157,048 157,048 157,048 157,048 157,048
See notes to Tables 3 and 8. All specifications have city-specific trends. The benefits variables are annual. The specifications for receipt of benefits are linear probability models. ‘**’ (‘*’) superscript indicates estimate is
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0.037 for contractor-only living wages.
With regard to employment, the estimates are – as theory would predict – uniformly
negative. The preferred estimates are statistically significant, indicating that, for example, a
50% increase in a business assistance living wage reduces employment in the bottom decile
of the skill distribution by 2.8 percentage points; the corresponding estimate for contractor-
only living wages is 2.4 percentage points.
Looking at what is perhaps a good criterion with which to judge the efficacy of living
wages, the updated evidence through 2009 continues to find – as did the earlier research –
that living wage laws can reduce urban poverty. The new evidence finds this effect only for
business assistance living wage laws. Moreover, there is some ambiguity as to how strong
this evidence is statistically. The estimated effect is statistically significant for the full
extended sample period, indicating that a 50% increase in a business assistance living wage
reduces poverty by 1.2 percentage points. But given concerns over the aggregation of urban
areas, if we extend the estimates only to the time when the aggregation becomes necessary
(2003 in this case), the estimate, while a shade larger, is no longer statistically significant.
All told, in our view this updated evidence is broadly consistent with the conclusions that
Holzer’s (2008) review of the earlier evidence reached – that living wages have modest bene-
fits for some workers and modest costs for others, and may also result in modest reductions
in poverty. And we would add that the latter conclusion is true only of business assistance
living wage laws, and not of narrower contractor-only laws. Updating the evidence has led
to some changes in the point estimates, and perhaps also introduced a bit more uncertainty
because depending on which data one uses and for what period, the estimates sometimes
change. But this overall conclusion is still quite consistent with the data. Living wages do re-
duce employment among the least-skilled workers they are intended to help. But they also
increase wages for many of them. This implies that living wage laws generate both winners
and losers among those affected by them, and the net effects lean toward modest reductions
in urban poverty.Endnotes
1 In the United States the federal government sets a minimum wage. States can pass a
higher minimum wage for the workers covered by the federal minimum wage, but not a
lower minimum wage. They can pass any minimum wage for workers not covered by the
federal minimum wage. The federal minimum wage covers most workers.
2 See Table 1 in Neumark and Adams (2003a).
3 In addition, living wage laws often impose a higher living wage if the employer does not
provide health insurance to its workers. Whether such requirements increase health insur-
ance coverage of workers remains unanswered.
4 This is the central focus of research on minimum wages as well. For a comprehen-
sive review of evidence on the employment effects of minimum wages, see Neumark
and Wascher (2007). When we say that “economic theory predicts job losses,” we are re-
ferring to the standard neoclassical theory of the firm. As discussed in Neumark and
Wascher, there are other models where this prediction is less clear. However, the evi-
dence is strongly consistent with the neoclassical model, in that most research on mini-
mum wages confirms that they generate disemployment effects.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/115 See Burkhauser et al. (1996) and Carrington and Fallick (2001).
6 Many of these earlier studies were recently published in Pollin et al. (2008). These
studies were often done by advocates for living wages. For example, Pollin et al. (2008)
refer to the higher wages that “low-wage workers deserve” (p. 13, italics added), and view
living wages as “a means through which we can both protest and formulate a concrete al-
ternative to the economic injustices that have prevailed in the United States for over a
generation” (p. 21).
7 For a full discussion of the details regarding the econometric analysis, see Adams
and Neumark (2005a).
8 Most but not all living wage laws fall into one of these two categories.
9 To be clear, an estimate so much below one estimate does not imply that the living wage
is not enforced and hence does not increase wages of affected workers. Rather, the living
wage only applies to a subset of the workers studied because there is no way to identify in
the CPS data which workers are and are not covered. This issue is discussed more below.
10 Given an average employment rate of about 0.4 for individuals in this range of the
imputed wage distribution, if the estimated employment effect is compared with the esti-
mated wage effect, the evidence indicates an employment elasticity with respect to the
“realized” wage increase of −1.9 [(−5.3/0.40)/7.0], larger than the −0.5 figure that is taken
as a consensus in the labor demand literature (Hamermesh, 1993). This suggests that the
estimated disemployment effect, insofar as it arises solely due to the “average” wage effect
of living wages, is larger than would be expected. However, living wages may entail greater
increases in projected future labor costs than the wage increase that identifies the typical
labor demand elasticity, given their frequent indexation. Also, this elasticity focuses on
one narrow category of workers rather than on labor overall, so substitution possibilities
may be greater.
11 We note that, for the most part, wage and employment effects above the 10th percent-
ile of the wage or predicted wage distribution were weaker, although Neumark and Adams
sometimes found hints of evidence of positive wage or employment effects between the 10th
and 50th percentiles, consistent with substitution toward higher-skilled labor. (See Adams
and Neumark, 2005a, Table 4.)
12 Lester and Jacobs (2010), in a recent study, conduct the only other national analysis of
business assistance living wages that parallels the Neumark and Adams research in conduct-
ing a before-and-after analysis of the effects of living wages in many cities. There is also a
more limited study of the same type of living wage laws in California (Lester, 2011). As dis-
cussed in detail in Charles River Associates (2011), these studies have substantial limitations,
aside from the inability of the data they use to distinguish low-skilled workers, as discussed
below.
13 For purposes of full disclosure, Neumark and Holzer have co-authored studies to-
gether. However, these were studies of affirmative action and not of living wages (or mini-
mum wages).
14 These criticisms are still aired frequently by organizations advocating for living
wages. See, e.g., http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/AssessmentEDCStudyMay2011.
pdf?nocdn=1 (viewed November 28, 2012).
15 Fairris and Reich erroneously apply the overall estimated labor demand elasticity
implied by the estimates, which is −2.6, to the percentage increase in the living wage
(−2.60 × 0.35 = −0.91). But the −2.6 elasticity is the percentage change in employment
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/11for a 1% increase in the overall wage paid to affected workers. Since the elasticity of
wages with respect to the living wage is small (0.067), the correct estimate calculated
this way has to multiply −2.6 by 0.067, yielding a much smaller number.
16 They write, “The City of Los Angeles’ enforcement database was used to identify
contracts with low-wage workers. The lists of firms were stratified by industry and oc-
cupational groupings before a random sample of employers was taken” (p. 12).
17 This quote is at odds with Pollin et al.’s claim (in a book of which Luce is a co-author)
that “the findings that city administrations have applied the living wage business-assistance
clauses to few, if any, firms, is consistent with Luce’s (2004) extensive study on the successes
and pitfalls of implementing living wage ordinances” (2008, p. 246).
18 Of course another possibility is that because of industries they are in, the labor demand
elasticities of business assistance recipients are inherently different. For example, suppose the
typical contractor is in the garbage business, and the typical business assistance recipient is in
retail. The elasticity of demand for labor in retail may be much greater because it is easier to
substitute away from labor – for example, just allowing slightly longer lines – whereas in the
garbage business there may be little flexibility with regard to the labor input, and the cost of
labor may be low relative to the cost of capital, energy, etc.
19 Pollin et al. (2008) (echoing Brenner et al., 2002) make a particularly misleading ar-
gument about business assistance coverage. They assert that the Neumark and Adams
estimates of the effects of business assistance living wage laws are flawed because they
define “potentially covered workers as all private sector workers (usually about 90–95
percent of the workforce)” (p. 240). This is a a mischaracterization. Neumark and
Adams (2003a) tried to substantiate their results indicating that business assistance liv-
ing wages increased wages of low-wage workers by attempting to distinguish workers
who could not be covered from those who could potentially be covered. For business
assistance laws, an upper bound estimate would include the entire private sector – up-
wards of 90% of the workforce. They clearly stated that they “chose the broadest defini-
tions of potential coverage, so as not to exclude those that are potentially affected. At
best, we identify those workers who could in principle be covered; actual coverage rates
should be much lower than those we report” (Neumark and Adams, 2003a, p. 509).
Pollin et al. report results reclassifying workers as covered by business assistance living
wage laws only if they work in service industries likely to be covered by contractor pro-
visions. They then report as an independent finding that the Neumark and Adams results
were reversed, with positive wage effects for the uncovered. The empirical finding is mean-
ingless, however; what Pollin et al. have done, essentially, is to flip the classifications of
workers as potentially covered by business assistance versus uncovered, by removing from
the potentially covered group all those outside the services industry. Not surprisingly, then,
the original results also flip. (Pollin et al. also never explain why workers potentially covered
by business assistance living wage laws should be restricted to those in services, since it is
the contractor living wage laws that generally apply only to the services industry.)
20 Brenner et al. assumed that Neumark and Adams required 25 (or 30) covered workers
in their sample from Los Angeles-Long Beach to obtain reliable estimates, and based on the
number of sampled workers and a coverage estimate, suggested that the odds of getting 25
workers was 1 in 500,000 (falling to 1 in 244,000,000 for 30 workers). The Los Angeles liv-
ing wage law took effect in April 1997; hence, if the CPS samples 5,000 wage earners per
year (as Brenner et al. say), the relevant sample size would be about 18,750 (5,000 multiplied
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and Adams (2003a). In this case, based on their coverage estimate, the expected number of
covered workers in the sample would be 31 (1 more than the number that they argue
Neumark and Adams would meet or exceed with a probability of only 1 in 244,000,000).
21 Of course one can ask whether there is a better alternative data set. Lester and Jacobs’
(2010) recent study uses the National Establishment Time Series (NETS), a longitudinal
data set on the universe of business establishments in the United States, which has the ad-
vantage of identifying the cities in which business establishments are located. However, the
NETS has information only on total employment counts, not on employment of workers in
different skill groups or their wages. As a result, Lester and Jacobs can only test for aggre-
gate employment effects – either for the private sector as a whole, or specific industries that
might be more affected by business assistance living wage laws. They cannot estimate wage
or employment effects on the least skilled, nor can they say anything about how living
wages affect families; hence the NETS data cannot address the central policy question of
whether living wage mandates ultimately help or hurt those whom they affect.
22 The 2004 MORG file contains some CBSA codes and some MSA codes, suggesting
that the change to CBSA occurred mid-year 2004 in the MORG file, while the ASEC defin-
ition change occurred distinctly between the 2004 and 2005 year files. The crosswalk was
thus applied to the 2004–2009 MORG files, and the 2005–2009 ASEC files.
23 After this matching, 14 of the 275 CBSA codes that remained do not match to any
MSA or PMSA. These are generally smaller cities, such as Coeur D’Alene, ID and Bend,
OR. However, these unmatched CBSAs are not relevant for our analysis, because we restrict
the data to urban areas with a minimum number of observations (described below), and
none of the unmatched CBSAs meet the criterion for the minimum number of
observations.
24 See http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/ (viewed November 9, 2010).
25 We had this information on many cities from the earlier research. But we wanted to
confirm that information and to use a consistent method of obtaining information on living
wages for the entire sample period.
26 We also used the search bar provided on the city website to search for items containing
“living wage,” “living,” “wage,” “livable,” “equal wage,” and any ordinance information col-
lected from the current code.
27 An appendix table available from the authors lists the living wage levels by year for
these cities. Some cities passed laws that were never implemented, for instance because
of a subsequent court decision (see Adams and Neumark, 2005b). These living wage
laws are not included.
28 We collected extensive information on other characteristics of living wage laws,
with the goal of estimating effects of different types of laws. However, it turned out to
be fruitless to estimate the effects of many of these features of living wage laws, because
there simply are not that many cities with living wage laws, and once we look for spe-
cific features of the laws, there is at most a handful of them. This issue highlights why
simulation studies can add complementary information about the likely effects of a spe-
cific living wage law, given sufficiently detailed data. An appendix table available from
the authors lists these living wage characteristics for the 26 living wage cities in our
analysis sample.
29 The maximum is the minimum wage if there is no living wage.
Neumark et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012, 1:11 Page 32 of 34
http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/1130 The effects of living wages (and minimum wages) are estimated contemporan-
eously, and at six- and 12-month lags. Typically the effects show up at a lag of
12 months, so we highlight these estimates in this paper. Living wage effects may arise
with a lag for a couple of reasons. First, in many cities there was an initial period of
ambiguity and little or no implementation and enforcement between the time when a
living wage law was passed and city administrators began to implement the law in a
serious way (e.g., Sander and Lokey, 1998). Second, living wages are not immediately
applied to all businesses. For example, for contractors they are typically only applied as
contracts are renewed, and for business assistance recipients, they are usually only ap-
plied to new recipients of assistance. More generally, employers would not be expected
to respond immediately to changes in labor costs, as they make the adjustments neces-
sary to use less low-skilled labor. However, this last consideration should apply to em-
ployment effects, but not wage effects.
31 This is a standard panel data approach, although a recent paper (Neumark et al.
2012) shows that sometimes the restriction to linear trends can generate biased
estimates.
32 Recall that there are two criteria for central or principal cities. First, we selected all
central or principal cities that had a population of at least 250,000 residents according
to 2000 Decennial Census data. Second, if no city in the metropolitan area had at least
250,000 residents, we included the largest city in the metropolitan area. When there is
more than one such city, we assign a living wage based on a population-weighted aver-
age across the MSAs/PMSAs of the central or principal cities.
33 If there is some disemployment, then presumably some of the lowest-wage workers lose
their jobs (or do not get hired), in which case, by construction, wages in the lowest decile
must increase. Thus, a precise estimate of a wage effect of zero would be puzzling given the
evidence of disemployment effects. However, we instead find a relatively imprecise estimate
of a positive wage effect.
34 Effects of mandated wage floors on wages above the floor are also sometimes inter-
preted as “ripple effects” to capture more direct effects on wages as, for example,
employers preserve wage spreads between workers.
35 This same point helps explain why it is in no way contradictory to find that living
wages reduce poverty (as reported below) but minimum wages do not (Wu et al., 2006;
Neumark et al., 2005). The gains and losses from living wages may be of different mag-
nitudes, affect different workers, and fall at different points in the distribution of family
income than do the gains and losses from minimum wages.
36 Neumark and Adams (2003a) wrote: “Living wages have only been in existence for
a short time, however, and as yet in a limited number of cities. More work will need to
be done to evaluate whether the evidence we find holds up in a larger sample of cities
that have adopted such legislation over a longer period of time” (p. 520).
37 This analysis extends through 2003 (and not 2004, the last year before the geo-
graphic classification changed), because the ASEC files cover the previous year.
38 We re-estimated the model in column (6) using the larger sample of 91 MSAs/
PMSAs that does not restrict attention to the subsample for which we do the wage ana-
lysis. The results were very similar.
39 Earlier work on this question includes Shaviro (1999) and Toikka et al. (2005), although
neither looks at longitudinal evidence on what happens when living wages are implemented.
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wage debate about the basic proposition that the effects of living wages on families are dissi-
pated because of high implicit marginal tax rates on low-income families. For example, Pollin
et al. (2008, Ch. 7) study how the proposed Santa Monica living wage would have affected
families, based in part on survey evidence. As they acknowledge, “when living wage laws raise
a family’s earned income, it means that government support for which such families are eli-
gible correspondingly declines while their tax obligations rise. This means that some signifi-
cant share of the benefits from living wage standards becomes a leakage – with government
agencies, rather than low-wage workers and their families, becoming the beneficiaries of the
law” (p. 108). And, in fact, the magnitude of this “leakage” (which is exactly the same as the
implicit marginal tax rate) is in the range of that estimated by Toikka et al. (2005). In particu-
lar, for Santa Monica, Pollin et al. estimate that only 50% of the increased earnings actually
benefits families, or that the marginal tax rate is 50%. Although not exactly comparable,
Toikka et al. report a marginal tax rate of 48% for Los Angeles (Table 6).
40 Note that the estimates of the effects of living wages on poverty take account of
transfer income but not non-cash benefits or the EITC.
41 The CPS also has information on participation in WIC but only for a limited number
of years; and eligibility for WIC is determined by a number of criteria unrelated to income.
42 In a simulation study of the effects of a proposed living wage for New York City,
Neumark et al. (forthcoming) predict that winners would outnumber losers by a ratio
of nearly six to one.
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